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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to provide qualitative models characterizing 
interdependencies related failures of two critical infrastructures: the electricity 
infrastructure and the associated information infrastructure. The interdependen-
cies of these two infrastructures are increasing due to a growing connection of 
the power grid networks to the global information infrastructure, as a conse-
quence of market deregulation and opening. These interdependencies increase 
the risk of failures. We focus on cascading, escalating and common-cause fail-
ures, which correspond to the main causes of failures due to interdependencies. 
We address failures in the electricity infrastructure, in combination with acci-
dental failures in the information infrastructure, then we show briefly how ma-
licious attacks in the information infrastructure can be addressed. 
1   Introduction 
In the past decades, the electric power grid experienced several severe failures that 
affected the power supply to millions of customers. The most recent one occurred in 
November 2006 in Western Europe when a shutdown of a high-voltage line in Ger-
many resulted in massive power failures in France and Italy as well as in parts of 
Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria, and even extended as far as 
Morocco. About ten million customers were affected by this failure. Similar major 
blackouts with even more severe consequences have occurred in summer 2003 in the 
United States, in Canada and in Italy [1, 2]. These events highlight the vulnerability of 
the electric grid infrastructures and their interdependencies. The large geographic 
extension of power failures effects is related to i) the high interconnectivity of power 
grid transmission and distribution infrastructures and to ii) the multiple interdepend-
encies existing between these infrastructures and the information infrastructures sup-
porting the control, the monitoring, the maintenance and the exploitation of power 
supply systems. An interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between two infra-
structures through which the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated to 
the state of the other. Clearly there is a need to analyze and model critical infrastruc-
tures in the presence of interdependencies in order to understand i) how such interde-
pendencies may contribute to the occurrence of large outages and ii) how to reduce 
their impact.  
This paper focuses on two interdependent infrastructures: the electric power infra-
structure and the information infrastructures supporting management, control and 
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maintenance functionality. More specifically, it addresses modelling and analysis of 
interdependency-related failures between these infrastructures.  
We concentrate on cascading, escalating and common-cause failures, which corre-
spond to the main causes of interdependency-related failures. We model the infra-
structures globally, not explicitly modelling their components. The models presented 
are qualitative ones. They describe scenarios that are likely to take place when fail-
ures occur. The models are built based on assumptions related to the behaviour of the 
infrastructures as resulting from their mutual interdependencies.  
In the remainder of this paper, we will first address failures in the electricity infra-
structure and accidental failures in the information infrastructure, considering the 
three classes of interdependencies, then we will illustrate briefly how malicious at-
tacks of information infrastructures can be addressed. 
Section 2 presents the background and related work. Sections 3 and 4 are dedicated 
to modelling interdependencies taking into account failures in the information infra-
structure and in the electricity infrastructure. Section 3 addresses accidental failures in 
the information infrastructure while Section 4 addresses malicious attacks. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
2. Background and Related Work 
Interdependencies increase the vulnerability of the corresponding infrastructures as 
they give rise to multiple error propagation channels from one infrastructure to an-
other that make them more prone to exposure to accidental as well as to malicious 
threats. Consequently the impact of infrastructure components failures and their se-
verity can be exacerbated and are generally much higher and more difficult to foresee, 
compared to failures confined to single infrastructures. As an example, most major 
power grid blackouts that have occurred in the past were initiated by a single event (or 
multiple related events such as a power grid equipment failure that is not properly 
handled by the SCADA, i.e., Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition, system) that 
gradually leads to cascading failures and eventual collapse of the entire system [2]. 
Infrastructure interdependencies can be categorized according to various dimen-
sions in order to facilitate their identification, understanding and analysis. Six dimen-
sions have been identified in [3]. They correspond to: a) the type of interdependencies 
(physical, cyber, geographic, and logical), b) the infrastructure environment (techni-
cal, business, political, legal, etc.), c) the couplings among the infrastructures and 
their effects on their response behaviour (loose or tight, inflexible or adaptive), d) the 
infrastructure characteristics (organisational, operational, temporal, spatial), e) the 
state of operation (normal, stressed, emergency, repair), the degree to which the infra-
structures are coupled, f) the type of failure affecting the infrastructures (common-
cause, cascading, escalating). Other classifications have also been proposed in [4-6, 
29]. In particular, the study reported in [29], based on 12 years public domain failure 
data, provides useful insights about the sources of failures affecting critical infrastruc-
tures, their propagation and their impact on public life, considering in particular the 
interdependencies between the communication and information technology infrastruc-
ture and other critical infrastructures such as electricity, transportation, financial serv-
ices, etc. 
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Referring to the classification of [3], our work addresses the three types of failures 
that are of particular interest when analyzing interdependent infrastructures: 
i) cascading failures, ii) escalating failures, and iii) common cause failures. Defini-
tions are as follows: 
- Cascading failures occur when a failure in one infrastructure causes the failure of 
one or more component(s) in a second infrastructure. 
- Escalating failures occur when an existing failure in one infrastructure exacer-
bates an independent failure in another infrastructure, increasing its severity or the 
time for recovery and restoration from this failure. 
- Common cause failures occur when two or more infrastructures are affected si-
multaneously because of some common cause. 
It is noteworthy that these classes of failures are not independent; e.g., common-
cause failures can cause cascading failures [7]. 
Among the three relevant types of failures in interdependent infrastructures, the 
modelling of cascading failures has received increasing interest in the past years, in 
particular after the large blackouts of electric power transmission systems in 1996 and 
2003. Several research papers and modelling studies have been published on this topic 
in particular by the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology Solutions 
(CERTS) in the United-States [8]. A large literature has been dedicated recently to the 
elaboration of analytic or simulation based models that are able to capture the dynam-
ics of cascading failures and blackouts. A brief review of related research addressing 
this topic is given hereafter. A more detailed state-of-the art can be found in [9, 10].  
In [11, 12], the authors present an idealised probabilistic model of cascading fail-
ures called CASCADE that is simple enough to be analytically tractable. It describes 
a general cascading process in which component failures weaken and further load the 
system so that components failures are more likely. This model describes a finite 
number of identical components that fail when their loads exceed a threshold. As 
components fail, the system becomes more loaded, since an amount of load is trans-
ferred to the other components, and cascading failures of further components become 
likely. This cascade model and variants of it have been approximated in [13-15] by a 
Galton-Watson branching process in which failures occur in stages, with each failure 
giving rise to a Poisson distribution of failures at the next stage.  
The models mentioned above do not take into account the characteristics of power 
systems.  An example of a cascading failures model for a power transmission system 
is discussed in [16]. The proposed model represents transmission lines, loads, genera-
tors and the operating limits on these components. Blackout cascades are essentially 
instantaneous events due to dynamical redistribution of power flows and are triggered 
by probabilistic failures of overloaded lines. In [17] a simulation model is proposed to 
calculate the expected cost of failures, taking into account time-dependent phenomena 
such a cascade tripping of elements due to overloads, malfunction of the protection 
system, potential power system instabilities and weather conditions. Other examples 
emphasizing different aspects of the problem have been proposed e.g., in [18-21], in 
which hidden failures of the protection system are represented. Their approach uses a 
probabilistic model to simulate the incorrect tripping of lines and generators due to 
hidden failures of line or generator protection systems. The distribution of power 
 4 
system blackout size is obtained using importance sampling and Monte-Carlo simula-
tion.  
Recently, new approaches using complex networks theory have been also proposed 
for modelling cascading failures [22-27]. These models are based on the analysis of 
the topology of the network characterizing the system and the evaluation of the resil-
ience of the network to the removal of nodes and arcs, due either to random failures or 
to malicious attacks).  
All the models discussed above adopt a simplified representation of the power sys-
tem, assuming that the overloading of system components eventually leads to the 
collapse of the global system. However, these models do not take into account explic-
itly the complex interactions and interdependencies between the power infrastructure 
and the ICT infrastructures. Moreover, the modelling of escalating failures is not 
addressed. Further work is needed in these directions. This paper presents a prelimi-
nary attempt at filling such gaps.  
3. Accidental failures in the information infrastructure 
Our aim is to model the infrastructures behaviour together, when taking into ac-
count the impact of accidental failures in the information infrastructure and failures in 
the electricity infrastructure, as well as their effects on both infrastructures. Modelling 
is carried out progressively: 
- First, we model cascading failures by analysing the constraints one infrastructure 
puts on the other one, assuming that the latter was in a working state when an 
event occurs in the other one.  
- Then, we address cascading and escalating failures considering successively: 
- constraints of the information infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure, 
- constraints both ways (of the information infrastructure on the electricity infra-
structure and of the electricity infrastructure on the information infrastructure). 
- Finally, we address common-cause failures. 
 
For the sake of clarity, and in order to avoid any confusion between the two infra-
structures, we use specialized but similar terms for the two infrastructures states and 
events as indicated by Table 1.  
Table 1. States and events of the infrastructures 
Information Infrastructure Electricity Infrastructure 
i-failure e-failure 
i-restoration e-restoration 
i-working e-working  
Partial i-outage Partial e-outage, e-lost 
i-weakened e-weakened 
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3.1. Modelling cascading failures 
We first analyse the impact of accidental i-failures on each infrastructure assuming 
that the electricity infrastructure is in an e-working state, then we analyse the impact 
of e-failures on each infrastructure assuming that the and information infrastructure is 
in an i-working state, before considering the combined impact of i- and e-failures in 
Section 3.2.  
3.1.1 Impact of information infrastructure failures (i-failures). Accidental i-
failures, hardware- or software-induced, affecting the information infrastructure can 
be: 
- Masked (unsignalled) i-failures, leading to latent errors. 
- Signalled i-failures. 
Latent errors can be:  
- Passive (i.e., without any action on the electricity infrastructure), but keeping the 
operators uninformed of possible disruptions occurring in the electricity infra-
structure. 
- Active, provoking undue configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure. 
After signalled i-failures, the information infrastructure is in a partial i-outage 
state: the variety of functions and components of the information infrastructure, and 
its essential character of large network make unlikely total outage. Latent errors can 
accumulate. Signalled i-failures may take place when the information infrastructure is 
in latent error states. When the information infrastructure is in a partial i-outage state, 
i-restoration is necessary to bring it back to an i-working state. 
Fig. 1-a gives the state machine model of the information infrastructure taking into 
account its own failures. It is noteworthy that all states are presented by several boxes, 
meaning that a state corresponds in reality to a group of different states that are con-
sidered as equivalent with respect to the classification given in Table 1. For example 
all states with only one busbar isolated can be considered as equivalent irrespective of 
which busbar is isolated. 
We assume that an i-failure puts some constraints on the electricity infrastructure 
(i.e., cascading failure), leading to a weakened electricity infrastructure (e.g., with a 
lower performance, unduly isolations, or unnecessary off-line trips of production 
plants or of transmission lines).  
From an e-weakened state, a configuration restoration leads the electricity infra-
structure back into a working state, because no e-failures occurred in the electricity 
infrastructure. Accumulation of untimely configuration changes, may lead to e-lost 
state (i.e., a blackout state), from which an e-restoration is required to bring back the 
electricity infrastructure into an e-working state. Fig. 1-b shows the constraint that the 
information infrastructure puts on the electricity infrastructure when the latter is in an 
e-working state.  
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-a- Failure behaviour  of the information 
 infrastructure  
-b- Impact of the information infrastruc-
ture on the electricity infrastructure 
Fig.1. Impact of i-failures on infrastructures behaviour 
3.1.2 Impact of electricity infrastructure failures (e-failures). We consider that the 
occurrence of e-failures leads the electricity infrastructure to be in a partial e-outage 
state, unless propagation within the infrastructure leads to loosing its control (e.g., a 
blackout of the power grid), because of an i-failure (this latter case corresponds to 
escalating events that will be covered in the next section). Fig. 2-a gives the state 
machine model of the electricity infrastructure taking into account its own failures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-a- Failure behaviour of the electricity 
infrastructure  
-b- Impact of the electricity infrastructure on 
the information infrastructure 
Fig. 2. Impact of e-failures on infrastructures behaviour 
Also e-failures may lead the information infrastructure to an i-weakened state in 
which parts of the information infrastructure can no longer implement their functions, 
although they are not failed, due to constraints originating from the failure of the 
electricity infrastructure. Fig. 2-b shows the constraint that the electricity infrastruc-
ture puts on the information infrastructure assuming that the latter is in an i-working 
state.  
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the states and events of each infrastructure, taking into 
account cascading events, as described above.  
 
 7 
Table 2. States and events of the information infrastructure 
Events 
Signalled i-
failure 
Detected i-failure 
Masked i-failure Undetected i-failure 
i-restotation Action for bringing back the information infrastructure in its normal 
functioning after i-failure(s) occurred 
States 
i-working The information infrastructure ensures normal control of the 
electricity infrastructure 
Passive latent 
error 
Parts of the information infrastructure have an i-failure, which 
prevents monitoring of the electricity infrastructure: e-failures may 
remain unnoticed 
Active latent error Parts of the information infrastructure have an i-failure, that may lead 
to unnecessary, and unnoticed configuration changes 
Partial i-outage Parts of the information infrastructure have knowingly an i-failure. 
Partial i-outage is assumed: the variety of functions and of the 
components of the infrastructure, and its essential character of large 
network make unlikely total outage 
i-weakened Parts of the information infrastructure can no longer implement their 
functions, although they do not have an e-failure, due to constraints 
originating from e-failures, e.g., shortage of electricity supply of 
unprotected parts. 
Table 3. States and events of the electricity infrastructure  
Events 
e-failure Malfunctioning of elements of the power grid: production plants, 
transformers, transmission lines, breakers, etc.  
e-restoration Actions for bringing back the electricity infrastructure in its normal 
functioning after e-failure(s) occurred. Typically, e-restoration is a 
sequence of configuration change(s), repair(s), configuration 
restoration(s) 
e-configuration 
change 
Change of configuration of the power grid that are not immediate 
consequences of e-failures, e.g., off-line trips of production plants or of 
transmission lines 
e-configuration 
restoration 
Act of bringing back the electricity infrastructure in its initial 
configuration, when configuration changes have taken place 
States 
e-working Electricity production, transmission and distribution are ensured in 
normal conditions 
Partial e-outage Due to e-failure(s), electricity production, transmission and distribution 
are no longer ensured in normal conditions, they are however somehow 
ensured, in degraded conditions  
e-lost Propagation of e-failures within the electricity infrastructure led to 
loosing its control, i.e., a blackout occurred. 
e-weakened Electricity production, transmission and distribution are no longer 
ensured in normal conditions, due to i-failure(s) of the information 
infrastructure that constrain the functioning of the electricity 
infrastructure, although no e-failure occurred in the latter. The 
capability of the electricity infrastructure is degraded: lower 
performance, configuration changes, possible manual control, etc. 
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3.2. Modelling cascading and escalating failures 
The global state machine model of the two infrastructures is built progressively: 
- Considering, in a first step, only the constraints of the information infrastructure 
on the electricity infrastructure. 
- Considering constraints of each infrastructure on the other. 
Fig. 3 gives a state machine model of the infrastructures, taking into account, only 
the constraints of the information infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure. The 
states are described in terms of the statuses of both infrastructures. Both cascading 
failures (states 3, 4) and escalating ones are evidenced, with a distinction of conse-
quences of the latter in terms of time to restoration (state 6) and of severity (state 7). 
Dependency of the electricity infrastructure upon the information infrastructure is 
illustrated by the need for both i- and e-restoration from states 6 and 7.  
A noteworthy example of transitions from states 1 to 2, and from 2 to 7 relates to 
the August 2003 blackout in the USA and Canada: the failure of the monitoring soft-
ware was one of the immediate causes of the blackout, as it prevented confining the 
electrical line incident, before its propagation across the power grid [1].  
 
Fig. 3. State Machine taking into account constraints of the information infrastructure on the 
electricity infrastructure 
A Petri net representation of the Fig. 3 model is given by Fig. 4 which enables to 
evidence the cascading and escalating mechanisms. Such mechanisms are, in Petri net 
terms, synchronizations between the individual events of the infrastructures. Table 4 
gives the correspondence between the states and events of Figures 3 and 4. 
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This Petri net is deliberately kept simple. In particular, it does not distinguish the 
individual states within a group of states represented by several boxes in Fig. 3. For 
example, state 2 of Fig. 3 that represents in reality a set of states is represented by a 
single state in the Petri net of Fig. 4.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Example of a high level Petri net associated to the model of Figure 3 
Table 4. Correspondence between states and events of Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 
 
States in 
State 
Machine
Markings in the 
Petri net
1 P1, P5
2 P2,P5
3 P4,P5,P11
4 P3,P5,P8
5 P1,P6
6 P7
7 P9  
Transitions in State Machine 
Transitions in the 
Petri net 
1 ! 2 T1
1 ! 3 T4 - !1
1 ! 4 T2 - !3
1 ! 5 T7 - !10
2 ! 4 T3 - !2
2 ! 7 T7 - !10 - !6
3 ! 4 T5 - !9
3 ! 7 - configuration change T8
3 ! 7 - e-failure T7 - !10 - !7
4 ! 1 T6
4 ! 6 T7 - !4
5 ! 1 T9
5 ! 6 T2 - !5
5 ! 7 T1 - !6 or T4 - !8
6 ! 1 T10
7 ! 1 T11   
Fig. 5 gives a state machine model of the infrastructures, taking into account the 
constraints of the electricity infrastructure on the information infrastructure in addi-
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tion to those of the information infrastructure on the electricity infrastructure already 
considered in Fig. 3. In addition, Fig. 5 assumes possible accumulation of e-failures 
from states 5 to 7 and from the escalation restoration state 6 to the escalation severity 
state 8.  
 
 
Fig. 5. Model of the two infrastructures when considering accidental failures 
3.3. Modelling common-cause failures 
Figure 6 gives a model with respect to common-cause failures that would occur when 
the infrastructures are in normal operation, bringing the infrastructures into states 6 or 
8 of Figure 5, i.e., to escalation. Should such failures occur in other states of the infra-
structures of Figure 5 model, they would also lead to states 6 or 8. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Common-cause failures model 
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Considering common-cause failures does not introduce additional states, they how-
ever add direct transitions from already existing states that do not exist when consid-
ering only cascading and escalating failures. The states of the resulting model become 
almost totally interconnected.  
4. Malicious attacks of the information infrastructure 
We consider malicious attacks of the information infrastructure and their conse-
quences on the electricity infrastructure. Due to the very nature of attacks, a distinc-
tion has to be performed for both infrastructures between their real status and their 
apparent status. For the electricity infrastructure, the apparent status is as reported by 
the information infrastructure. 
 
Attacks fall into two classes:  
- Deceptive attacks that are provoking unperceived malfunctions, thus similar to the 
latent errors previously considered,  
- Perceptible attacks creating detected damages. 
 
Deceptive attacks can be:  
- Passive (i.e., without any direct action on the electricity infrastructure).  
- Active, provoking configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure. 
 
Fig. 7 gives the state machine model of the infrastructures. This model and the pre-
vious one are syntactically identical: they differ by the semantics of the states and of 
the inter-state transitions. Let us consider for example states 2 and 3. 
In state 2, the effects of the passive deceptive attack are: i) the information infra-
structure looks like working while it is in a partial i-outage state due to the attack, 
ii) it informs wrongly the operator that the electricity infrastructure is in partial i-
outage, and as consequence iii) the operator performs some configuration changes in 
the electricity infrastructure leading it to a i-weakened state. Accumulation of con-
figuration changes by the operator may lead the electricity infrastructure into e-lost 
state.  
In state 3, the effects of the active deceptive attack are: i) the information infra-
structure looks like working while it is in a partial i-outage state due to the attack, 
ii) it performs some configuration changes in the electricity infrastructure leading it to 
a weakened state without informing the operator that the electricity infrastructure is in 
partial e-outage, for whom the electricity infrastructure appears if it were working. 
Accumulation of configuration changes by the information infrastructure may lead the 
electricity infrastructure into a e-lost state. 
The difference between states 2 and 3 is that in state 2 the operator has made some 
actions on the electricity infrastructure and is aware of the e-weakened state, while in 
state 3 the operator is not aware of the actions performed by the information infra-
structure on the electricity infrastructure.  
 12 
 
Fig. 7.  Model of the two infrastructures when considering malicious attacks 
 
After detection of the attack, the apparent states of the infrastructures become iden-
tical to the real ones (state 4), in which i-restoration and configuration restoration are 
necessary to bring back the infrastructures to their working states. 
States 5, 6 and 7 are very similar respectively to states 5, 6 and 7 of Fig. 5, except 
that in state 6 the information infrastructure is in a partial i-outage state following a 
perceptive attack in Fig. 7 and following a signalled i-failure in Fig. 5. 
In Fig. 7, state 8 corresponds to e-lost state but the operator is not aware, he/she 
has been informed wrongly by the partial i-outage of information infrastructure that it 
is in a partial e-outage state. 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have introduced qualitative models allowing the description and 
the analysis of the behaviour of the information and electricity infrastructures taking 
into account the effect of failures of each infrastructure on the other one. These mod-
els describe, at a high level, scenarios that may occur when failures occur and the 
relationship between the states of the two infrastructures.  
We have presented different models when considering accidental failures in the in-
formation infrastructure and when accounting for malicious attacks. Currently we are 
investigating a unified model for taking into account both classes of failures of the 
information infrastructure.  
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The high level models developed in this paper are to be refined to evaluate quanti-
tative measures characterizing the impact of the interdependency-related failures on 
the resilience of the electricity and information infrastructures, with respect to the 
occurrence of critical outages and blackouts. In particular, in parallel to this work, 
within the CRUTIAL project, preliminary investigations have been carried out in 
order to develop a hierarchical modelling framework aimed at the detailed modelling 
of the electricity and information infrastructures taking into account their internal 
structure, and accidental failures [28]. When considering accidental failures, model-
ling techniques such as stochastic Petri nets or stochastic activity networks, comple-
mented by data collected from observation of the two infrastructures (or based on 
more general data, see e.g., [29]) are used. Consideration of malicious attacks raises 
some difficulties and challenges. Indeed, the very definition of security measures and 
evaluation has been, and is still, a research topic (see e.g., [30, 31]). Future work will 
be focussed on the definition of an integrated modelling approach that is well suited 
to take into account the combined impact of accidental as well as  malicious faults. 
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